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ABSTRACT 
 
Motivated by the increasing popularity and attention shareholder proposals on CSR attract, the 
purpose of this study is to provide a detailed portrayal of shareholders’ demands for CSR through 
their proposals. To this end, we conduct a descriptive longitudinal study of the CSR proposals 
submitted to US corporations for the fiscal years 1996 to 2009. We use a unique coding process 
in which we identify both the CSR area of concern to the shareholders and the desired effect the 
proposal is intended to stimulate on the corporation. Our findings expose how shareholders 
engage with corporations mostly around the issues of governance and environment, requesting 
more transparency from the companies and sometimes improved actions or business decisions. 
Firms from a wide range of industries are targeted, with their levels of CSR performance, 
profitability and size attracting different kinds of requests in terms of CSR areas and expected 
outcomes for the corporation. Shareholders can be relatively intense in their requests for CSR, 
with the majority of the firms in our sample being targeted more than once a year by CSR 
proposals. Our study deepens our understanding of shareholders’ concerns and requests for 
improvements in CSR. 
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1. Introduction 
Shareholder proposals1 on corporate social responsibility (CSR) issues have been the 
subject of numerous reports in recent years (e.g. Copland and O’Keefe 2012, 2013, 2014; Singer 
2012, 2013; Cook 2013; IRRC 2013). These reports attest to a considerable increase in the 
proportion of CSR proposals in the proxy season, representing as much as half of all proposals 
examined (Copland and O’Keefe 2014). Examples of companies acquiescing to shareholders’ 
proposal requests are also regularly reported in the press (Solomon 2014; Clark 2015). The 
practitioner literature offers different views on this phenomenon. On the one hand, CSR proposals 
are viewed to signal growing investors’ concerns about CSR issues (CERES 2013, 2014b) and to 
act as catalysts of change towards a more responsible management (Fellow 2013). On the other 
hand, some criticize these proposals as distracting the management from the maximization of 
share value, going against the interests of “ordinary” investors (Copland and O’Keefe 2012, 
2013). Nevertheless, the business literature contends that CSR proposals are here to stay (Fellow 
2013), gaining support from an ever growing range of investors (Ryan 2013; Solomon 2014) with 
investors broadening the coverage of the sustainability-related issues they target with their 
proposals (Ceres 2014a). 
Our study to explore the phenomenon of CSR shareholder proposals is motivated by this 
prediction that proposals will continue to gain in popularity in the future, combined with the 
significant attention these proposals attract from practitioners and the debate they generate among 
them. With a spirit similar to that of Graves, Rehbein and Waddock (2001), our aim is to provide 
an updated detailed portrayal of shareholders’ demands for CSR through their proposals. To this 
end, we conduct a longitudinal study of the CSR proposals submitted to US corporations for the 
fiscal years 1996 to 2009.  
                                                          
1
 We use the term shareholder proposals (rather than resolutions) in our analysis to encompass all the 
demands for CSR shareholders present to corporations, independently of whether they will eventually be 
voted for. 
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Our study contributes to the literature by documenting, across industry and time, the 
growing phenomenon of CSR-related shareholder proposals using a unique and innovative 
classification of the outcomes requested by shareholders, wherein we distinguish requests for 
transparency, actions impacting operations, adoption of codes and standards, among others. 
Evidence about this issue has been called for in order to develop our understanding of 
shareholders’ engagement strategies (Sjöström 2008). Indeed, while different forms of 
stakeholder engagement have been studied in sustainability accounting research (see for e.g. 
Deegan and Blomquist 2006; Archel et al. 2009; Mäkelä and Näsi 2010), shareholders’ 
engagement through proposals has been under researched thus far. Our study aims to extend our 
knowledge of stakeholder engagement and demands for CSR by examining a key stakeholder 
group, the shareholders. We do recognize that shareholders submitting CSR proposals might not 
be representative of all shareholders (Gillian and Starks 2007), but based on the constantly 
growing responsible investment movement (see Coulson and O’Sullivan 2014; Rinaldi, Unerman 
and Tilt 2014), we contend that they represent a significant group of shareholders deserving our 
attention. 
Our main findings show an increase in shareholder proposals on CSR issues over the 
period studied, with governance and environment being the most important areas of concern for 
shareholders throughout the years. We observe a significant rise in shareholders’ demands for 
improved transparency, which is not echoed by a similar increase in demands for actions on 
operations. Targeted companies are spread across various industries, indicating how this mean of 
shareholder engagement is widespread and not industry-specific. The size, profitability and CSR 
performance of the targeted firms will attract different requests in terms of CSR issues and 
expected changes in corporations. Companies are subject to relatively intense levels of proposals, 
with firms being targeted more than once a year by CSR-related proposals in almost 60% of our 
sample. 
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The remaining manuscript is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes prior literature 
on shareholder engagement and shareholder proposals to set the background to our study. Section 
3 presents our methodology. Sections 4 to 6 organize our findings into a detailed portrayal of 
shareholder proposals on CSR, an empirical investigation of the companies’ characteristics 
attracting different shareholder requests, and an analysis of activist shareholders, both in terms of 
nature and intensity of demands. Section 7 discusses our findings and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Background 
This section summarizes the ways through which shareholders and investors engage with 
corporations to ask for CSR. It then details the engagement approach on which we focus, 
shareholder proposals. 
2.1 Shareholders’ demands for CSR 
Prior work has identified different ways for shareholders and investors to engage with 
corporations to demand CSR initiatives. For instance, investors were shown to request different 
types of environmental performance indicators (covering compliance with environmental laws, 
climate change and biodiversity protection) in strategic performance measurement systems to 
ensure both monitoring and improvement in environmental management (Rodrigue, Magnan and 
Boulianne 2013).  
Shareholders also request disclosure on social and environmental issues (Rinaldi, 
Unerman, and Tilt 2014), and have done so for a long period of time. Indeed, before the more 
widespread publication of sustainability reports and website disclosure, shareholders were 
reported to seek environmental information in annual reports (Deegan and Rankin 1997). They 
also raised concerns about the quality of CSR information (Dawkins and Lewis 2003), which 
prompted some sophisticated investors to establish private disclosure channels with corporations 
(Solomon and Solomon 2006). In these private disclosure sessions, investors ask for 
supplementary social, environmental and ethical information to further their understanding of 
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CSR management as well as to assess management quality (Solomon and Darby 2005). Climate 
change is a predominant issue in these sessions, with risk management representing a major 
concern and business opportunities arising from climate change an emerging interest (Solomon et 
al. 2011). In recent years, investors also pressure firms to disclose more voluntary public 
disclosure and to improve the quality of their disclosure, in part through the responsible 
investment movement and the social ratings agencies2 (Coulson and O’Sullivan 2014; Rinaldi, 
Unerman, and Tilt 2014). Indeed, a social rating agency was observed to confirm, complement 
and contradict corporate disclosures about environmental issues, thereby attempting to engage 
with the corporation on CSR issues (Rodrigue 2014). Social rating agencies were also viewed to 
engage with companies through the tone (positive, negative or neutral) of their own disclosure 
about corporations (Rodrigue, Cho, and Laine 2015). 
2.2 A particular engagement approach: Shareholder proposals 
Shareholders also place demands for CSR upon corporations through shareholder 
proposals, an official written demand submitted to companies for consideration and potentially 
for vote at the annual general meeting (AGM). In the US, any shareholder that has held shares in 
a publicly traded corporation valued at $2,000 or more for at least a year can introduce proposals 
for consideration (SEC rule 14a-8, see SEC, 1998).  
Introduced proposals meet one of three types of faith. First, a corporation may choose to 
petition the SEC to be authorized to exclude the proposal from its proxy statement, drawing on 
dispositions of the SEC rule14a-8. These dispositions allow proposals to be contested on the 
basis, among others, that “the proposal (1) reflects a personal grievance, (2) requires the firm to 
violate state, federal, or international law, (3) relates to operations accounting for less than 5 
percent of the firm’s assets, sales, and revenue, or (4) deals with a “matter relating to the 
company’s ordinary business operations” (Tkac 2006, 4). The latter is the most frequent argument 
                                                          
2
 Social rating agencies provide investment research on the CSR performance of companies (e.g. 
Sustainalytics). 
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set forth to be granted exclusion. Proposals for which the SEC has approved exclusion are termed 
omitted proposals. This omission clearly signals management’s non-responsiveness to the issue 
raised by shareholders (Clark and Crawford 2012). Second, management can engage with the 
shareholders and get them to agree to withdraw the proposal in exchange for changes in corporate 
policies and/or activities (David, Bloom, and Hillman 2007; Logsdon and Van Buren 2009; Byrd 
and Cooperman 2014). Third, a proposal can be included in the proxy statement and submitted to 
vote by all the shareholders, thereby exposing the issue of concern at the AGM. Voted proposals 
do not bind management into implementing the requested changes, i.e. managers still decide 
whether they will enact the proposal voted on or not, even when it gets the majority of votes. This 
is why most activist shareholders consider managers to be the most responsive to proposals when 
they negotiate a withdrawal, rather than allowing a vote (Tkac 2006; David, Bloom, and Hillman 
2007; Clark and Crawford 2012).  
CSR-related proposals constitute a formal and visible signal of shareholders’ discontent 
about a specific social or environmental issue (David, Bloom, and Hillman 2007; Reid and Toffel 
2009). This discontent may be driven by financial concerns – associated with traditional 
shareholders’ interests – or by investors’ social and environmental moral principles (Goranova 
and Ryan 2014; Sjöström 2008). The ultimate value of shareholder proposals does not lie in their 
short-term voting results. Rather, proposals are valuable since they expose corporate policies and 
practices to a wide range of stakeholders (Clark and Crawford 2012). They can represent a long-
term tactic adopted by shareholders to bring about changes in corporations through dialogue 
(Tkac 2006), a reassessment of their challenged activities (Clark and Crawford 2012) and/or 
industry spillover effects, with competitors of targeted firms likely to proactively adapt their CSR 
practices (Reid and Toffel 2009).3  
                                                          
3
 Nevertheless, the effectiveness of CSR proposals to foster organizational change remains debated (Haigh 
and Hazelton 2004; David, Bloom, and Hillman 2007; Copland and O’Keefe 2014). 
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While accounting and finance have dedicated much attention to shareholder activism 
related to corporate governance and executive remuneration, to the best of our knowledge, CSR 
proposals are under researched.4 Furthermore, despite their increasing popularity in the proxy 
season (Cook 2013; Copland and O’Keefe 2014), these proposals have not attracted much 
attention in the sustainability accounting literature (Sjöström 2008). Thus, similar to Graves 
Rehbein, and Waddock’s study (2001) – which assessed the overall landscape of shareholder 
resolutions between 1988 and 1998 – we provide an updated and detailed portrayal of shareholder 
proposals challenging CSR. Specifically, we aim to 1) describe the trends, issues raised and 
requests made in this type of shareholder demands for CSR in practices over more than a decade, 
2) empirically investigate which company characteristics attract different types of shareholder 
demands, 3) analyse who are the sponsor shareholders and how intensive is the pressure they 
place on companies. 
 
3. Sample and methodology 
Our sample is composed of 3,921 CSR-related proposals in the ISS/IRRC Governance 
shareholder proposals database presented over the period 1997-20105 for which we have 
complete information about whether it was omitted, withdrawn or voted for. The proposals refer 
to 738 unique firms.  
As they target a specific corporate activity or policy, proposals constitute a wealth of 
information about shareholders’ demands for CSR, with respect to both the area of desired 
                                                          
4
 For an extensive and complete review of the multidisciplinary nature of shareholder activism, see 
Goranova and Ryan (2014). The authors qualify this research stream as being a “relatively young and 
vibrant field” (1231) and note that “researchers in finance and accounting often exclude social-issue 
shareholder proposals as frivolous” (1249). (An exception in the finance literature is Byrd and Cooperman 
(2014), who investigate the way firms handled environmental and health proposals.) They also observe that 
the management literature devoted more attention to CSR proposals. However, the last portrayal of CSR-
related proposals in this literature ends in 1998 (Graves, Rehbein, and Waddock 2001). 
5
 We cover the proposals presented at the annual general meeting (AGM) of the fiscal years 1996-2009. As 
the AGM might take place in a different solar year, overall we cover all shareholder proposals presented 
from 22-Jan-1997 to 15-Oct-2010. In the following analysis, however, for simplicity we report data using 
the fiscal year it refers to. 
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intervention (be it human rights, environmental issues, governance or community matters) and the 
type of change shareholders request for the targeted practice (in other words, the expected 
outcome of the proposal if it was to be implemented by the corporation). Thus, for each proposal 
included in this database, we followed a strict coding procedure to classify the proposal along two 
key dimensions: the CSR area it refers to, and the expected outcome of the proposal. While we 
adopt a straightforward procedure to classify the CSR areas by relying on the categorization 
proposed by the well-known CSR rating agency KLD, we define different categories of outcomes 
drawing on a preliminary survey of a sub-sample of proposals and other descriptive evidence 
gathered by IRRC (2013).  
In the first coding dimension, seven CSR areas are defined: environment, community, 
human rights, employee relations, diversity, product and governance (KLD 2007). Furthermore, 
we separately classified proposals as “controversial issues” if they referred to any of the 
following issues: alcohol, gambling, tobacco, firearms, military or nuclear power (KLD 2007).  
With the second dimension of the coding, we want to capture the desired effect, or type of 
impact or expected outcome that the proposals aim to achieve. We believe this classification adds 
to our understanding of shareholder proposals, given that “less prescriptive proposals” are more 
likely to receive greater support (IRRC 2013). We define six different potential impacts: action 
on business operations and/or decision; adoption of code of conduct; change of policy; adoption 
and/or compliance with standards; change in the governance structure; and reporting. We further 
allow a residual category “other”, which contains remaining miscellaneous effects.  
Finally, we also separately identified those (relatively few) proposals that were in fact 
asking companies to reduce their CSR involvement. Appendix 1 shows some examples of the 
proposals and their classification. 
The coding was carried out in two phases. In the first phase, we trained a research 
assistant by conducting a pilot test on a sub-sample of proposals (n = 50). During and after the 
pilot test, we discussed all doubts and revised the coding rules/guidelines to address potential 
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ambiguous coding. The research assistant then coded all the remaining proposals. To classify 
each proposal, we mainly relied on the short description of the proposal provided by the 
ISS/IRRC database, which is indicative of the content of the proposal (see Appendix 1 for 
examples). In the advent of an ambiguous description, the original text of the proposal was 
retrieved to complete and validate the coding. The authors jointly carried out this task. 
 
4. Evolution patterns of CSR proposals 
We start our analysis from the overview of time trend over our observation period. Figure 
1 shows the number of proposals presented during fiscal years 1996-2009. From 1998 to 2007, 
the trend steadily increased while, more recently, the trend seems to have stabilized at about 350 
proposals. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
4.1 CSR areas 
We summarize the results of the proposals into different CSR areas using Figure 2, which 
shows the incidence of each type of proposal over the total proposals submitted each year, along 
with a discussion on other (untabulated) descriptive statistics and trends. As the graph shows, by 
far there is a large and increasing incidence of proposals addressing corporate governance issues, 
with a maximum of 40.4% in relation to fiscal year 2008 (this type of proposal also presents the 
highest absolute number of submitted proposals). Environmental issues are also quite common 
(through time the average percentage of environmental proposals is 19.3%), especially at the 
beginning of our sample period (more than 20% in the period 1996-1998) and in the most recent 
year (in 2009, the proportion of proposals questioning environmental issues is 29.2%). Product 
responsibility and diversity proposals constitute on average 16.7% and 15.8% of the submitted 
proposals respectively. The lowest (highest) incidence for product-related proposals is 9.1% 
(23.4%) in 1997 (1999). The lowest (highest) incidence for diversity-related proposals is 12.5% 
(19.4%) in 2008 (2001). While the number of diversity proposals has been quite steady over time, 
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the number of product-related proposals follows an increasing trend, with a peak (in absolute 
terms) in 2003. The rest of the CSR areas seem to have a relatively lower incidence: on average 
in the sample period we have 4.2% human rights, 8.2% employee relations, 5.2% community and 
7.4% controversial issues proposals. In absolute terms, the number of these proposals does not 
follow a specific path. Human rights, community and controversial issues show an important 
peak in 2002, with 17, 26 and 32 proposals submitted respectively, while human rights proposals 
have two peaks: in 2002 (n = 17) and 2007 (n = 29). Employee relation proposals show a 
fluctuating trend up to 2004, and subsequently, a quite sharp decreasing trend. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
 
4.2 Expected outcome  
We now move on to the discussion of what the proposals actually ask companies to do, 
i.e. the type of change shareholders demand. Figure 3 plots the number of proposals according to 
the expected outcome they intend to create.  
Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
As the graph shows, the number of proposals asking for transparency (reporting) is by far 
higher than other types of expected outcomes (on average over time the incidence of proposals 
demanding any form of reporting s 41.4%, the absolute average s 119.71). Changes to the 
governance structure are the less requested (average incidence is 7.9%, with average n = 21.64). 
Actions on business operations were quite common up to 2004, they subsequently declined, 
settling at about the same number as those that request changes in policy. Up to 2004, the average 
incidence (number) of proposals on actions on business operations was 23.4% (56.7) versus 
14.2% (34.3) for proposals on change of policy. After 2004, the average incidence is 16.2% 
(57.6) for proposals demanding actions on business operations versus 16.9% (60) for change of 
policy. Examples of the “most popular” proposals with actions or policy outcomes are reported in 
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Table 1. It is worth noting that both types of proposals may also refer to requests “against” CSR, 
such as for example “refraining from making charitable contributions”, or “don’t waste corporate 
funds on CO2 reduction”, although these types of anti-CSR requests are rare.  
Insert Table 1 about here  
 
What is even more striking is the absolute inverse path of demands for actions on 
business operations in comparison to demands for reporting. After 2004, the decline in the 
demand for changes in business operations is more than counterbalanced by the rapid growth of 
transparency requests. While this evidence is preliminary and descriptive, we can only speculate 
about the reasons behind these trends. One possible explanation might be related to both the rules 
that apply to shareholder proposals and the desire by shareholders to improve management 
response to their cause. The management can petition the SEC to exclude a proposal for various 
reasons (see above). According to Tkac (2006), most firms oppose CSR-related proposals on the 
grounds that it deals with a matter relating to the company’s ordinary business operations. Thus, 
the likelihood that proposals asking for actions (such as using non-animal test methods for 
cosmetic and pharmaceutical companies, restricting sales of genetically engineered goods for 
food companies, or reducing toxicity of product formulations for chemical companies) will be 
opposed is high. On the other side, we believe demand for reporting and more transparency is 
harder to oppose by the management, at least by means of the SEC rules. It is also relatively 
easier to gain consent on among the shareholder basis as it can be “sold” as a relatively costless 
activity for the firm while at the same time providing shareholders with ex-post monitoring 
power, as – if successful– it will provide additional information to monitor managerial 
performance.  
In order to test this idea, we ran a simple correlation analysis among the following 
variables: dummy variable equal to 1 if the proposal is requiring an action on business operation, 
0 otherwise (action); dummy variable equal to 1 if the proposal is requiring to report and disclose 
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information, 0 otherwise (reporting); dummy variable equal to 1 if the proposal is omitted, 0 
otherwise (omitted); dummy variable equal to 1 if the proposal is withdrawn, 0 otherwise 
(withdrawn); dummy variable equal to 1 if the proposal is voted for, 0 otherwise (voted). Table 2 
reports the correlation coefficients. 
Insert Table 2 about here  
 
Evidence of the highly significant and positive correlation coefficient between action and 
omitted indicates that shareholders proposals asking companies to change their business 
operations or decisions are more likely to be opposed by the management. In contrast, the 
significant and negative coefficient between reporting and omitted suggests that demand for 
transparency is less likely to be successfully petitioned to the SEC. Furthermore, the negative 
correlation coefficient between action and withdrawn shows companies are less inclined to 
negotiate this type of request before the annual general meeting. 
We now probe into the increasing demand for transparency. It consists of a total of 1,676 
proposals, 73% of which refer to governance, environment or product issues (Figure 4).  
Insert Figure 4 about here  
From the governance proposals, we further separately identify 210 proposals requesting 
the initiation of stand-alone reporting (either labelled as social, environmental or sustainability 
reports). In Figure 4, this is depicted by the continuous line. Early years (1996-2001) of the 
sample mainly request issuance of environmental reports. There is then a constantly increasing 
trend starting in 2002 up to 2006, with quite a big jump in the demand for stand-alone reporting 
between 2005 and 2006. We try to explain what might have driven the trend in the demand for 
stand-alone reporting by identifying two key events: the launch of the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI) in 2000 and the release of the G2 in 2002 as well as the subsequent revision and release of 
the G3 in 2006. In support of this speculation, among the governance proposals, we note that 
14 
 
there are 9 and 19 proposals in 2002 and 2003 respectively that explicitly request “to report using 
the GRI guidelines”.  
With respect to the rest of the demands for transparency in governance issues, the main 
recurring request is for political donations disclosure. This trend explains the peak in 2003, when 
the number of proposals requesting to “report on political donations and policy” is 35.  
Transparency in environmental issues proposals mainly seeks to obtain information about 
energy use and pollution (especially GHG emission levels), starting from 2001. More recently, 
since 2006, the demand for climate change information and details on how companies will deal 
with risks associated with climate change have been the most prominent types of proposals, 
consistent with this environmental issue being predominant for shareholders (Solomon et al. 
2011; Rodrigue, Magnan, and Boulianne 2013). 
Finally, for transparency on products, there is no particular observable trend and the 
proposals mainly concern food and beverage companies and the use of genetically modified 
ingredients and chemical/pharmaceutical companies on drug prices policies and animal testing. 
 
4.3 Degree of success 
As the last dimension of the analysis of the trend in CSR shareholder activism, we look at 
the degree of success of these proposals. Byrd and Cooperman (2014, 231) note that “with limited 
data on negotiated and withdrawn resolutions, previous empirical studies have focused on proxy 
proposals brought to a vote at annual meetings where public data are available”. Along these 
lines, we also deem important to include withdrawn proposals in the analysis. As such, we look at 
both the management reactions (how many are opposed and omitted vs. how many are withdrawn 
by the shareholders because the management has already incorporated some initiatives towards 
the shareholders’ request) and voting results.  
Figure 5 plots the cumulative number of proposals classified according to whether they 
are omitted, voted or withdrawn. First, the graph tells us that most of the proposals get voted for. 
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Second, it shows that the number of proposals omitted is quite constant over time: as the number 
of proposals grows, there is also an increasing number of proposals withdrawn. This seems to 
indicate that companies are listening, to some extent, to shareholders’ requests. 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
 
Figure 6 shows some more details. In particular, while the proportions of proposals voted, 
withdrawn or omitted were essentially equally distributed in the first years, over time the 
proportion of proposals voted for at the AGM increased, ranging between 50% and 60%. The 
proportion of proposals omitted decreased and settled below 20%, and the proportion of proposals 
withdrawn remained relatively stable between 25% and 35%, until 2008 when the proportion 
increased to above 38%.  
Taking the evidence in Figures 5 and 6 together, it appears that shareholders are 
becoming more and more successful at both negotiating with the firm (number of withdrawn 
proposals increases with time) and exposing their concerns to other stakeholders through the 
inclusion of proposals submitted to vote at the AGM (proportion of proposals voted for is the 
highest).  
 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
 
Finally, in Figure 7, we plot the average percentage of votes in support of CSR proposals. 
The bold line shows an increasing trend in support, although there is a sharp drop in 2007 (due 
mainly to the low support obtained for human rights proposals). In terms of a breakdown by CSR 
areas, untabulated tests show that the proposals with the highest (lowest) support relate to 
diversity (community), with an average support during the time period of 17.7% (6.3%). Finally, 
from Figure 7, we also note that generally support for proposals demanding transparency is 
higher than support for proposals demanding changes in business operations. The overall mean is 
11.9% for proposals demanding reporting versus 9.9% for proposals demanding actions. 
16 
 
Furthermore, we note the constantly increasing support obtained by requests for transparency 
versus the fluctuating support for proposals demanding changes in business operations. 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
 
5. Which companies are targeted? 
This section describes the characteristics of the firms that are subject to shareholder 
activism. First of all, from Figure 8, we see a wide range of industries experiencing the 
phenomenon. We observe that a relative great proportion of proposals address companies 
operating in environmentally sensitive industries, such as chemicals and oil. Nevertheless, there 
are several proposals targeting companies in industries that are not traditionally considered 
environmentally or socially sensitive, such as for example business services, eating and drinking 
places, insurance carriers and so on, indicating how this mean of engagement is widespread and 
not industry-specific.  
Insert Figure 8 about here 
 
We describe shareholder proposals by considering company characteristics commonly 
used in social and environmental accounting literature as proxies for political visibility of the firm 
(Berthelot, Cormier, and Magnan 2003) and other characteristics that the financial accounting 
literature has found to be associated with financial shareholder activism (Flammer 2015). We 
consider CSR performance, Concerns, measured as the sum of the total concerns score provided 
by KLD; Size, measured as the total revenues; and ROA, measured as EBIT over total assets. The 
literature suggests that shareholder proposals would target poor CSR performers, large companies 
and those with lower profitability, but it is not clear which characteristics matter the most with 
respect to the CSR area and expected outcome of the proposals. 
Table 3 presents the means of the continuous variables describing firms’ characteristics 
(size, ROA and concerns), for each separate sub-group of proposals, classified according to the 
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CSR area and expected outcome. The t-test descriptively shows that both CSR areas and expected 
outcomes are related to the company’s characteristics in different ways.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
For example, companies targeted for environmental, governance and human rights issues 
present lower CSR performance6 on average than other companies subject to shareholder 
activism, as indicated by the mean total concerns scores. On the other hand, companies targeted 
for diversity and employee relation issues show better CSR performance than the rest of the 
targeted companies. Companies targeted for community, environment, governance and human 
rights proposals are generally bigger than the rest, but those targeted for diversity and employee 
relation issues are significantly smaller. This is somewhat surprising because despite the 
significant difference in size, the target companies are still large, and thus, it is unlikely that they 
have no management systems in place for these dimensions. Finally, requests concerning 
employee relations, human rights and product responsibility are demanded of more profitable 
companies, while environmental and governance proposals are submitted to less profitable 
companies. 
The analysis of the expected outcomes of these proposals shows that, on average, 
requests for action are addressed to large companies and poor CSR performers; the adoption of 
codes and compliance with standards are demanded of companies that are smaller, more 
profitable and better CSR performers. On the other hand, proposals concerning changes to the 
governance structure address, on average, better CSR performers, smaller but less profitable 
companies. Finally, companies that are targeted for more transparency are poorer CSR 
performers, bigger and less profitable, which is consistent with the sustainability reporting 
literature (see Patten, Ren, and Zhao (2015) for an example). Collectively, this exploration shows 
that a unique profile of targeted companies does not appear to exist. Depending on the CSR area 
                                                          
6
 A higher total concern score corresponds to lower CSR performance. 
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or the expected outcome, the average targeted company will vary in terms of CSR performance, 
size and profitability. 
 
6. Shareholders and intensity of activism 
The last part of the analysis looks at who are the sponsor shareholders, and how intensive 
is their activism, in terms of how many proposals each company is subject to per year.  
As Figure 9 shows, the most active sponsors are religious institutions, socially 
responsible investment funds and pension funds, which account for 66.5% of all proposals 
submitted in the sample period. The other active shareholders are individuals, special interest 
groups (such as for example PETA – People for Ethical Treatment of Animals; Amnesty 
International; Rainforest Action Network, etc.), unions and other funds. Untabulated data reveal 
that while the most active shareholders at the beginning of the sample period (before 2000) were 
religious institutions and individuals (making up between 60% to 90% of the submitted 
proposals), their number and their incidence over the total number of proposals have been 
decreasing quite sharply. The 2000’s witness an exponential growth in activism of SRI and 
pension funds. 
Insert Figure 9 about here 
 
In order to analyse the intensity of shareholder activism, we determine how many 
proposals each company receives per year. Table 4 shows that companies are quite often subject 
to more than one proposal per year. In particular, cases in which companies get targeted more 
than once per year comprise 59.9% of the sample. There are also a few instances (4.9%) in which 
companies are seriously under pressure from shareholders, as the number of proposals submitted 
is greater than eight. Interestingly, the incidence of proposals being withdrawn, reflecting a 
positive response from the management, decreases with the intensity of the activism. For high 
intensity shareholder activism, it seems companies are more likely to oppose the proposal to the 
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SEC, thus suggesting that high intensity activism is found for the less responsive companies. 
Untabulated correlation coefficients between company characteristics and the intensity of 
shareholder activism provide evidence in line with the idea that the most visible firms are the 
ones most targeted by shareholders, as we find positive and significant coefficients for CSR 
concerns, size and environmentally sensitive industries. Furthermore, we also find a positive 
coefficient between ROA and number of proposals. This is not in line with the finding of 
financial shareholders’ activism (Judge, Gaur, and Muller-Kahle 2010), which reports less 
profitable firms to be targeted by shareholders. This result is not surprising as it could be that 
CSR activism targets firms that are quite profitable and have the resources to invest in CSR-
related programs and projects.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
Table 5 reports details of two cases of intense shareholder activism: ExxonMobil in 2010 
(fiscal year 2009) and Wal-Mart in 2008 (fiscal year 2008). This allows us to provide concrete 
examples of intense activism and offer a more comprehensive portrayal of instances of 
shareholder activism through the simultaneous consideration of proposal characteristics, targeted 
companies and sponsors. In the case of ExxonMobil, most of the 11 proposals refer to the 
environment and demand transparency and were voted on, although the support received was 
relatively low. Nevertheless, active shareholders deem that support levels above 20% send a 
significant signal to management (Fellow, 2013). As such, it would appear that activists consider 
having sent strong messages in four out of 11 proposals submitted to Exxon. Interestingly, all 
proposals requesting actions on environmental issues were voted on. As for Wal-Mart (2008), the 
nine proposals cover a broader range of CSR areas and expected outcomes. Interesting enough, 
the proposals for which shareholders demanded a combination of “actions” on “product” were 
opposed by the firm on the grounds that they deal with the company’s ordinary business. 
According to Tkac (2006, 4), “This last rationale is the one that most firms cite when seeking to 
exclude social activists’ proposals. The pivotal term here is ‘ordinary business operations,’ which 
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includes day-to-day management of the firm, production, and the workforce as well as those 
issues on which stockholders ‘would not be in a position to make an informed judgment.’” These 
cases of intense activism expose the breadth of concerns shareholders may have with respect to a 
single firm and the variety of responses they elicit from the corporation. This detailed analysis is 
also consistent with our findings that different companies will be targeted along different areas 
and outcomes, with varying degrees of success. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Stakeholder engagement is viewed as a cornerstone of social and environmental 
management and reporting (O’Dwyer 2005; ISEA 1999). In this paper, we sought to describe a 
specific type of stakeholder engagement centred on a prominent stakeholder group, shareholder 
proposals. We illustrate how shareholders increasingly employ this approach over the years, with 
dominant concerns for governance, environment, product and diversity. While actions on 
operations and changes in policy are demanded by shareholders, most of their requests relate to 
improved transparency, with frequent demands for stand-alone reporting and political 
contribution disclosure. With an increasing number of proposals being withdrawn over time, it 
appears that shareholders are becoming more and more successful in influencing corporate 
activities. 
Shareholders target companies from a wide range of industries. The CSR areas and 
expected outcomes of their proposals vary depending on the firm’s characteristics, but do not 
necessarily follow the expected pattern found in the literature in which poor CSR performers, 
large and less profitable firms represent the usual targets. Multiple nuances are observed in our 
findings, implying that this mean of stakeholder engagement is both widespread and firm-
specific. Among shareholders submitting proposals, we note a predominance of religious 
institutions, pension funds and SRI funds, shareholders arguably concerns by social and financial 
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factors. Shareholders also intensely use this mode of engagement, with almost 60% of our sample 
firms receiving more than one CSR proposal per year. 
Our study is subject to limitations. While we describe the types of demands for CSR, we 
do not investigate what motivates shareholders to submit their proposals, be it economical, moral 
or other drivers. Future research into this issue would deepen our knowledge of shareholder 
activism. We also acknowledge that the portrayal we draw might not apply to all shareholders 
(Gillian and Starks 2007), as our proposals probably arise from CSR-aware shareholders. Future 
research could explore the difference between activist and non-activist shareholders to 
disentangle this issue. 
Collectively, our findings offer a detailed portrayal of an increasingly popular means of 
engagement adopted by shareholders to voice their CSR concerns to the corporation they invest 
in. Our main contributions lie in the development of a unique categorization scheme concerning 
the desired effect of the proposals along with our detailed classification of the proposals along 
two dimensions: CSR areas and expected outcomes. With this approach, we deepen our 
understanding of shareholders’ concerns and requests for improvement in terms of CSR.  
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Appendix 1. Examples of coding 
 
Proposal CSR area Expected outcome 
Adopt code of conduct for China 
operations 
Governance Adoption of codes  
Adopt comprehensive human rights policy Human rights Change of policy 
Adopt employee bill of rights Employee Adoption of codes  
Adopt EURODAD charter of responsible 
financing  
Community Adoption of codes 
Adopt sexual orientation anti-bias policy Diversity Change of policy 
Affirm political non-partisanship Governance Change of policy 
Develop human rights criteria for China 
operations 
Human rights Actions on business 
operations/decisions 
Develop renewable energy alternatives Environment Actions on business 
operations/decisions 
Disclose charitable contributions Community Reporting 
Divest tobacco holdings Controversial 
Issues 
Actions on business 
operations/decisions 
End political donations  Governance Actions on business 
operations/decisions 
Endorse CERES principles Environment Compliance with standards 
Establish board committee on sustainability  Governance Change in governance 
structure 
Implement ILO standards Employee Compliance with standards 
Implement MacBride principles Diversity Compliance with standards 
Increase board diversity Diversity Change in governance 
Structure 
Increase or promote use of cage-free eggs Product Actions on business 
operations/decisions 
Issue global warming report Environment Reporting 
Issue sustainability report Governance Reporting 
Link executive pay to social criteria Governance Change in governance 
structure 
Reduce greenhouse gas emissions  Environment Actions on business 
operations/decisions 
Report on EEO (equal employment 
opportunities) 
Diversity Reporting 
Report on pesticide reduction in supply 
chain  
Product Reporting 
Restrict sales of gene-engineered goods  Product Actions on business 
operations/decisions 
Review animal welfare standards Product Change of policy 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Most frequent proposals with expected outcome for actions or policies 
Action on business operations Change of policy 
Develop military contracting criteria 
Develop renewable energy alternatives 
Divest tobacco holdings 
Increase container recycling/recycled content 
Restrict sales of gene-engineered goods 
Reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
Reduce toxicity of product formulation 
Set GHG emissions reduction goals 
Take steps to prevent predatory lending 
Use non-animal test methods 
Adopt comprehensive human rights policy 
Adopt drug price restraint policy 
Adopt sexual orientation anti-bias policy 
Affirm political non-partisanship 
Implement equality principles 
Review animal welfare standards 
Review job cuts and relocations 
Review suppliers’ animal slaughter methods 
Review/amend human rights policy 
 
 
 
Table 2. Correlation between expected outcomes and proposal success 
 
action reporting 
action 1 
 
reporting -0.437*** 1 
omitted 0.092*** -0.043** 
withdrawn -0.075*** -0.016 
voted 0.001 0.048** 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 3. Company characteristics and shareholder proposals 
 
Mean of CSR Performance, Size and Profitability by CSR Area 
CSR Area Proposal? N. obs.1) Concerns (CSR perf.) 
Size 
(Sales M$) ROA 
Community No 3699 5.35 43,377.0 0.11 
 
Yes 187 5.66 54,067.1*** 0.11 
Controversial No 3622 5.39 44,649.4 0.11 
issues Yes 264 5.00* 33,492.7 0.12 
Diversity No 3294 5.63 46,412.5 0.11 
 
Yes 592 3.84*** 29,863.5*** 0.11 
Employee No 3579 5.46 44,564.7 0.11 
relations Yes 307 4.18*** 36,042.9** 0.13*** 
Environment No 3153 5.18 41,552.1 0.11 
 
Yes 733 6.12*** 53,954.1* 0.10*** 
Governance No 2901 5.2 41,569.8 0.12 
 
Yes 985 5.83*** 50,729.1*** 0.10*** 
Human No 3714 5.3 43,542.3 0.11 
rights Yes 172 6.77*** 51,430.5*** 0.12* 
Product No 3240 5.35 45,080.1 0.11 
 
Yes 646 5.41 37,929.7 0.13*** 
 
Mean of CSR Performance, Size and Profitability by Expected Outcome 
Expected 
outcome Proposal? N. obs.
1)
 
Concerns 
(CSR perf.) 
Size 
(Sales M$) ROA 
Actions No 3089 5.25 42,623.9 0.11 
 
Yes 797 5.79*** 48,804.1*** 0.11 
Adoption No 3842 5.38 43,988.2 0.11 
of codes Yes 44 4.09** 35,436.6* 0.15*** 
Change No 3283 5.36 43,922.9 0.11 
of policy Yes 603 5.36 43,720.4 0.11 
Compliance No 3517 5.59 46,091.6 0.11 
with standards Yes 369 3.16*** 22,921.2*** 0.13*** 
Governance No 3585 5.40 44,607.3 0.11 
structure Yes 301 4.92** 35,365.0*** 0.10** 
Other No 3775 5.32 43,444.2 0.11 
 
Yes 111 6.82*** 59,100.3*** 0.11 
Reporting No 2225 5.14 41,565.1 0.12 
 
Yes 1661 5.67*** 47,007.7*** 0.11*** 
1)
 We lose 35 observations due to missing data on CSR performance 
*, **, *** t-test significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively, one-tailed 
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Table 4. Intensity of activism 
 
N. of proposals per 
firm/year Freq. Acc. Freq. Firm/year Omitted Voted Withdrawn 
1 1,571 40.1% 704 11.70% 47.20% 41.10% 
2 835 61.4% 215 17.20% 50.50% 32.20% 
3 555 75.5% 96 18.60% 56.60% 24.90% 
4 287 82.8% 43 24.00% 55.40% 20.60% 
5 221 88.5% 24 22.60% 57.00% 20.40% 
6 105 91.2% 11 25.70% 57.10% 17.10% 
7 115 94.1% 12 27.00% 55.70% 17.40% 
8 71 95.9% 7 18.30% 64.80% 16.90% 
9 26 96.6% 3 34.60% 46.20% 19.20% 
11 88 98.8% 2 20.50% 58.00% 21.60% 
12 34 99.7% 2 35.30% 47.10% 17.60% 
13 13 100.0% 1 7.70% 84.60% 7.70% 
Total 3,921  1,120 661 2,203 1,237 
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Table 5. Intense activism cases: ExxonMobil and Wal-Mart 
Proposal Type of Sponsor CSR Area Expected Outcome Success Votes in Favour 
ExxonMobil AGM date: 26/05/2010 
Adopt sexual orientation anti-bias policy Pension Fund Diversity Change of policy Voted 22.2 
Preserve/restore Gulf Coast wetlands Religious Environment Actions Voted 9.1 
Report on climate change risks Other Environment Reporting Withdrawn 
 
Report on community hazards Religious Community Reporting Omitted (b-2) 
 
Report on energy independence through renewables Religious Environment Reporting Voted 6.7 
Report on environmental impact of fracturing SRI Fund Environment Reporting Voted 26.3 
Report on principles to stop global warming Union Environment Reporting Withdrawn 
 
Report on risk of lower fossil fuel demand Individual Product Reporting Voted *(i-11) 7.8 
Report on water use SRI Fund Environment Reporting Voted 6.7 
Review impact of oil sands operations SRI Fund Environment Actions Voted 26.4 
Set GHG emissions reduction goals Religious Environment Actions Voted 27.2 
Wal-Mart AGM date: 06/06/2008 
Adopt sexual orientation anti-bias policy Religious Diversity Change of policy Voted 6.0 
Ensure product safety Pension Fund Product Actions Omitted (i-7) 
 
Establish board committee on human rights SRI Fund Human rights Governance structure Voted 2.0 
Increase or promote use of cage-free eggs Special Interest Product Actions Omitted (i-7) 
 
Issue global warming report Special Interest Environment Reporting Omitted (i-10)  
Report on political donations and policy Pension Fund Governance Reporting Voted 12.0 
Review impact of poor labour practices SRI Fund Employee Actions Withdrawn 
 
Review nano-materials and product safety SRI Fund Product Actions Omitted (i-7) 
 
Review/report on charitable giving/policy Special Interest Community Reporting Omitted (i-12) 
 
* The company sought to exclude the proposal, appealing to omission rule (i-11) 
Omission rules: 
b-2: Proponent did not provide verification of stock ownership. 
i-7: Relates to the conduct of the company’s ordinary business. 
i-10: Is moot by being substantially implemented by the company. 
i-11: Is a duplicate of an earlier-submitted proposal that will be included in the proxy material for the same meeting. 
i-12: Did not receive the required number of votes cast at a previous shareholder meeting. 
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Time trend of shareholder activism 
 
The figure shows the number of proposals in each of the fiscal years covered by the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Incidence of proposals by CSR area 
 
The figure shows the CSR areas covered by the proposals over the period 1996-2009 and their incidence 
over the total number of proposals. 
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Figure 3. Time trend in expected outcome 
 
The figure shows the number of proposals by expected outcome over the period 1996-2009. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Time trend in the demand for transparency 
 
The figure shows the number of proposals requesting transparency by CSR area over the period 1996-2009. 
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Figure 5. Cumulative frequencies of proposals by degree of success 
 
The figure shows the cumulative number of proposals by degree of success over the period 1996-2009. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Incidence of proposals by degree of success 
 
The figure shows the incidence of proposals by degree of success over the period 1996-2009. 
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Figure 7. Voting results (in favour) 
 
The figure shows the percentage of votes in favour received for different types of proposals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Breakdown by industry 
 
The figure shows the breakdown of the number of proposals by industry. 
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Figure 9. Types of shareholders 
The figure shows the breakdown of the number of proposals by activist shareholder type. 
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